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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appellant respectfully submits the following brief
responding to Appellees' Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts previously submitted by Appellants,
as supplemented by reference to Appellees' brief is adequate to
support the arguments set forth herein.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED BY THE
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
Throughout their brief, Plaintiffs/Appellees have attempted
to obscure the concept of issue preclusion by injecting totally
irrelevant facts and legal concepts.

References to the second

corporate entity, referred to earlier as "NUF 2" are totally
irrelevant.

Although NUF 2 is clearly a new party to the second

case, Appellees' implication that this entity has any rights
under the June 15, 1990 contract is without merit.

If NUF 2 had

any rights to assert in the action, those rights would only
derive through assignment from NUF 1.
Plaintiffs/Appellees further imply that the fact that they
named the Limited Liability Company as a new party defendant
defeats the requirement that the parties must be the same or in
privy with those in the prior litigation.
Robertson

v.

Campbell,

The Berry court citing

694 P.2d at 123 0 (Utah 1983) makes it

clear that it is not necessary for a defendant who claims
collateral estoppel against a party who earlier lost the issue to
have been a party to that same action.

Berry

v. Berry,

246 (Utah App. 1987) Specifically citing Food for
v. 3839 Joint

Venture,

Health

738 P.2d
Company

129 Ariz. 103, 628 P.2d 986, 990-991

(1981) the court states that...
The defensive use of collateral estoppel,
used to preclude re-litigation of a claim,
occurs when a party defending a claim
2

attempts to assert a previous judgment, to
which it was not a party, against an opponent
who was a party. In effect, once a party has
had his day in court and loses, he does not
get a second chance, against a different
party, on the same claim, (emphasis in
original)
Clearly, the claims by NUF 1, NUF 2 and Paul Gardner all
arise under the NUF-Madsen contract, which was previously
litigated in front of Judge Frederick.
A.

Claim of Rights by Subsequent Corporation.

To begin with, the corporations (NUF 1 and NUF 2) are
creatures of statute, and have only the rights conferred to them
by statute, and then only so long as they conform with the
statutory requirements for their existence.

The facts of this

case are uncontested that NUF 1 was involuntarily dissolved by
the Corporation Division on May 1, 1990. Under the law it ceased
to exist as of that date, except for very limited rights to "wind
down" conferred upon it by statute.
On the other hand, NUF 2 did not exist prior to October 12,
1993, when it was admittedly incorporated.

It had no rights nor

powers which predated that event in spite of the self-serving
statement in the "purpose" section of the Articles of
Incorporation which purported to carry on the business of the
prior (NUF 1) corporation.

There was a legal void between May 1,

1990, and October 12, 1993, during which no corporate entity
existed by the name NUF, Inc.
The only way in which NUF 2 could possibly have any
enforceable rights relating back to the earlier entity would be
3

if there had been an indirect assignment of those rights or
benefits through a third party.

Although there was some

questionable testimony regarding an assignment from NUF 1 to Paul
Gardner, there was no testimony that Paul Gardner had ever made
any assignment of his rights to the corporation which was formed
after the summary judgment by Judge Frederick,1

Similarly, there

was no testimony of any kind that Paul Gardner had paid any
consideration for the assignment of rights purportedly held by
NUF 1 and purportedly transferred to him by oral assignment, nor
was there any evidence of consideration being paid by NUF 2 to
Mr. Gardner.
B.

Claim that Judgment was Procedural rather than
Substantive.

Plaintiffs/Appellees similarly attempt to create a
distinction between a procedural and a substantive disposition of
the first case in order to support an argument that there was no
final judgment in the first case before Judge Frederick.
However, the case law does not provide a distinction between
procedural and substantive orders as Plaintiffs/Appellees have
attempted to do on the basis of their interpretation of the case
of Jones,

Waldo,

Holbrook

& McDonough

lr

v.

Dawson,

2 98 Utah Adv.

The only testimony available on this issue was from
Plaintiffs.
The evidence which they produced at trial was
testimony from Mr. Gardner and his wife that there had been an oral
assignment of rights from NUF 1 to Mr. Gardner at a Board of
Director's meeting which was attended by them and Clayton
Wilkinson. (TT1:P123,124 and TT1: P188, 189)
Mr. Wilkinson
subsequently filed an affidavit with the court stating that he had
never attended any directors meeting with Gardners. See Affidavit
of Clayton Wilkinson in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for New
Trial, at P.2.
4

Rep. 8 (1996).

In the earlier case of Berry v. Berry,

246 (Utah App. 1987) this Court citing Copper State
v. Bruno,

738 P.2d

Thrift

735 P.2d 390 (Utah App. 1987) and StoII v.

& Loan

Gottlieb,

305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104 (1938) specifically
addressed the question "Was there a final judgment on the
merits?" (emphasis in original). Id.

at 249.

In response to that

question, this Court stated that "a judgment or order is final
for purposes of collateral estoppel until reversed on appeal,
modified or set aside in the court of rendition."

The Court

makes no distinction whatsoever as to whether the merits deal
with procedural or substantive issues.
In support of this argument, Plaintiffs argue that no issues
other than "standing" were before Judge Frederick.
is similarly misdirected for two reasons.

This argument

On the summary

judgment their entire complaint, and any legal or factual support
to sustain that complaint was before the court. (See Appendix A
of Addendum)

In fact, under the rules for determining summary

judgments all inferences were made in favor of
Plaintiffs/Appellees as the non-moving party.
importantly, as set forth in the Berry

However, more

case above, the test is

not what was actually before the court, but what could have been
put before the court. Id.
Aston,

at 249.

In the matter of D'Aston

v.

844 P.2d 345, (Utah App. 1992) this Court quoted

Throckmorton

and a line of preceding cases in setting forth the

criteria for a claim to be barred by res judicata.
those criteria reads as follows:

5

The second of

(2 the claim that is asserted to be barred must have
been presented or be such that it could have been
presented in the first case; D'Aston at 350.
Under this criteria, if there were any merit to Appellees'
allegations of an assignment from NUF 1 to Mr. Gardner, then that
claim could certainly have been raised in the case before Judge
Frederick.

The fact that Plaintiffs/Appellees failed to do so in

the first action does not entitle them to a second bite at the
apple.
C.

The Parties to the Second Case Were Not Identical to
Those in the First.

Finally, Plaintiffs/Appellees claim that issue preclusion
does not bar the second case because the parties to the second
action were different from those in the first action. However,
the correct test for parties is not that they be identical, but
that they must be either a party to, privy to or an assignee of a
party to the first case.

Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765 at

769 (Utah App. 1996), citing D'Aston

v. Aston,

844 P.2d 345, 350

(Utah App. 1992) . The evidence before the court in this case is
clearly that Paul Gardner was the moving party in both actions.
He was the president of NUF 1, and the president of NUF 2.
Testimony at the trial was that NUF and several other
corporations were "his companies".2

(TT1:P118-120)

Finally, at

trial both Mr. and Mrs. Gardner claimed that Paul Gardner was the
assignee of any rights held by NUF 1 in the contract with
Paragraph 2 of Appellees' statement of facts stated that
"While Mr. Gardner listed NUF, Inc. as the title holder, he
considered himself (as owner of NUF, Inc.) as the owner of the
boat."
6

Defendants Madsen.

In the case of Kunz & Co. v. State,

this

Court found that Kunz, as assignee of the rights of a non-related
third party assignor, was bound by the earlier decision by the
Utah Department of Transportation. Id.

at 769.

If the doctrine

applies to such an arms length transaction as that in Kunz,

it

should certainly apply to circumstances where the actual party
involved in both cases is the same Paul Gardner.
In the case of Berry

v. Berry

above, under circumstances

analogous to those in the present case, this Court found that
"the record indicates that the parties have had fair notice of
the previous action and an opportunity to appear before the
appropriate tribunals...to present their arguments.

If Appellant

failed to fully raise her arguments...it was not because she did
not have [the] opportunity to do so." Id at 249, 250.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONTRARY TO THE
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT,
PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER RATHER THAN NUF, INC. HAD A
CONTRACTUAL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS MADSEN
In attacking Appellants' Point II, Plaintiff argues that
Appellants failed to marshall facts regarding that contract.
However, as set forth in Appellants' brief, the issue is whether
the contract was ambiguous, thereby authorizing the court to go
beyond the four corners of the document. As set forth in
Appellants' brief, the contract is not ambiguous as to the
parties to the contract, and the testimony at the trial from Paul
Gardner was that he had made the changes to the contract which
deleted references to him personally and to his wife, and that he
7

had signed on behalf of the buyer as "NUF, Inc. by Paul Gardner"
(Pi. Exh. 11: Def. Exh. 2)

The meaning is clear and unambiguous.

As the Supreme Court stated in the matter of Ephraim

Theater

Co.

v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 223 (Utah 1958):
"the understanding thus expressed is plain
and provides no justification for a finding
based upon conduct..." Id. at 167, fn. 2.
This Court can decide as a matter of law whether that contract
was so ambiguous as to require the admission of parol evidence to
determine the meaning and intent of the parties.

It was

Plaintiffs who defined the party as NUF, Inc. and they should not
be allowed to modify the contract at the later date, by parol
evidence, to the detriment of Defendants/Appellants.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROPER
LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT THE CORPORATE
PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN DISSOLVED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE
CONTRACT AND THAT THE CONTRACT OR ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIGN
RIGHTS UNDER THAT CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE VOID
Appellees again attempt to characterize Appellants' point as
an attack on the factual determination made by the trial court.
This is incorrect.

The uncontroverted facts before the court

were that NUF 1 was dissolved on May 1, 1990 and that it
purported to enter into the contract with Madsens on June 15,
1990.

In reality, there is no possible factual determination

that can be made by the trial court which supports
Plaintiffs/Appellees arguments that any rights were assigned from
NUF 1 to Plaintiff Paul Gardner.

Granted the court did not make

a finding, nor was there any testimony as to the date that the
8

purported assignment took place. However, if the assignment took
place before June 15, 1990, even assuming that this Court ignores
the argument that there was no consideration nor was the
attempted assignment in writing, there were in fact no rights
under any contract with Madsens which existed at that time which
could have been assigned to Mr. Gardner.

On the other hand, if

the assignment was made at any time after May 1, 1990, then the
assignment would be void, as a matter of law, since the assignor
did not exist.

If the purported assignment took place between

May 1, 1990 and June 15, 1990, then both exclusions would apply
and the net result would be a non-entity assigning non-existent
rights.
By the same token, although Plaintiff argues that there was
"unobjected to evidence that Paul Gardner had a personal interest
in the boat" (Plaintiffs/Appellees' brief at page 13), that
argument totally ignores the fact that any rights that anyone had
to the houseboat, which was undisputedly previously owned by
Madsens, would have to be by contract.

The only contract which

transferred any interest in the boat was the written contract
between NUF 1 and Madsens. There was simply no other evidence
before the trial court as to any other contract. Until
Plaintiffs can show that the signed contract is ambiguous, any
evidence regarding Mr. Gardner's participation or usage is
irrelevant.
Finally, at page 15 of Appellees' brief, Plaintiffs argue
for the first time the concept of ratification of the contract.
9

However, that argument ignores the fact that even if Madsens did
intend to ratify the original contract, unless that contract was
modified to provide that Paul Gardner was a party, the
ratification would be with a non-existent entity.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL ERRED IN ASSESSING INAPPROPRIATE DAMAGES
BASED UPON THE FULL VALUE OF 3 0% OF THE TOTAL PRIME
USAGE WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAD PURCHASED ONLY 10% OWNERSHIP
IN THE ENTITY, FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF NONPEAK WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY CONVERTED TO PEAK
"SUMMER" WEEKS, AND IN DETERMINING THAT THE
SUBSEQUENTLY FORMED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF
Again, Plaintiffs attack this point on the basis that
Appellants have failed to marshall evidence.

However, Appellants

concede that they have not marshalled all evidence with respect
to all of the factual findings with which they disagree.

To do

so within the length of limitations of the brief would be
physically impossible.

Appellants did, however, marshall the

evidence with respect to several key points in order to
demonstrate to this Court that the issues decided by the trial
court were far from clear-cut.

In fact, it is painfully clear

that a finder of fact without even a slight interest in the
outcome might well have decided those factual issues differently.
The facts provided do directly support Appellants' obligations
set forth under Point V below.

10

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT HIS
NEPHEW WAS A PRINCIPAL IN THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND
A BUSINESS PARTNER OF PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER, IN
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW
TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE
In attacking Appellants' argument with respect to this
issue, Plaintiffs totally ignore the fact that Clayton Wilkinson
was a director of NUF 1, the party to the contract with Madsens.
Although Plaintiffs argue that Clayton Wilkinson has no interest
in the Plaintiff corporation, has no equity in any Plaintiff, and
has no equity or other interest in the outcome of the case
(Appellants' brief at 17), this argument flies in the face of
reality.

Clayton Wilkinson was admittedly a director of the

corporation (NUF 1) and as such has a fiduciary responsibility to
the corporate entity and therefore has a significant interest in
the outcome of the case.
Plaintiffs argue that Appellants "make no claim that Judge
Wilkinson's failure to disqualify himself was intentional or
malicious or that he acted differently than he would have
otherwise acted" (Appellees' brief at 17). This claim clearly
distorts the criteria for determining judicial conflict of
interest.

As is set forth in Regional

Sales

Agency

v.

Reichart,

830 P.2d 252, (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court has clearly
taken the position in its view toward the disqualification of
judges that there can be no apparent, or appearance of any,
conflict of interest. As set forth in Appellants' brief, Justice
Zimmerman spelled out a very stringent test when he stated that

"...under Canon 3, a relative of the
requisite degree of relationship has an
"interest" that might be sufficiently
"affected by the outcome" of a case in every
situation where a judge sits on a case in
which the judge's relative is a partner or
otherwise an equity participant in a firm
that represents a party to the case." Id. at
255.
The case which Justice Zimmerman was addressing was one in
which an attorney representing a client, had an interest, thereby
establishing a conflict of interest with Judge Billings, the
attorney's daughter-in-law.

That situation is even further

removed from a situation in which the relative is a director of
the corporation, and a business partner with an individual
participant in the case. The argument that the "partnership" in
Probe Realty was not involved in the case does not negate the
interest that Clayton Wilkinson might have in the outcome of the
case.

If the court applies the "appearance" of any gain, then

Judge Wilkinson clearly should have disqualified himself.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Appellants failed to object
to the conflict of interest raised by the relationship to the
judge at the time of trial. However, as set forth in Appellants'
original brief, and as documented by the Affidavit of Defendant
Kenneth Madsen, there was no indication of any sort from the
judge which might show any recognition or family relationship to
Mr. Clayton Wilkinson when the name was disclosed at trial.
Appellants did not discover the family relationship until after
Defendant Madsen received a telephone call and hired a
genealogist to look into a possible family relationship.
12

Appellants concede that normally an issue must be preserved
for appeal by the making of a timely objection at trial.
However, in the instant case, the parties who were prejudiced by
the relationship were the only parties to the transaction without
knowledge of the relationship.

Had the trial judge disclosed to

the parties that there was a family relationship between himself
and Clayton Wilkinson, then Defendants would have had the
opportunity to object at the time. However, where the trial
judge withheld that information, and where plaintiffs made no
effort to disclose the relationship at trial, then they should be
estopped from claiming that the objection was not timely made.
POINT VI
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF THEIR COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION
AT TRIAL AND ON THIS APPEAL
The matter having been resolved in the first case before
Judge Frederick, pursuant to § 78-26-56 of the Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended) the action brought by Plaintiffs in
this matter was, by definition, without merit and should entitle
Defendants/Appellants to their costs and attorney's fees in the
underlying action and in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
Although Plaintiffs have attempted to obscure the point
regarding the doctrine of issue preclusion, all of the tests have
been met, and they should be barred by that doctrine from even
proceeding with the second case which is the subject of this
appeal.

Similarly, the facts are undisputed that the parties to
13

the NUF-Madsen contract were NUF 1 and Madsens.

It is also

undisputed that NUF 1 was not a legal entity at the time that the
contract was made, nor when the action was brought to enforce
that contract.

Under such circumstances, Plaintiffs are not

entitled to enforcement of the contract.

Thirdly, even if the

Court finds that Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the
doctrine of issue preclusion, and further finds that they do have
an enforceable claim, then Defendants are entitled to a new trial
before a disinterested judge.
Finally, under circumstances where this case was resolved in
the first action and where the trial court awarded attorney's
fees to Plaintiffs in this action, Defendants should be awarded
all of their costs and attorney's fees in defending the second
action brought by Plaintiffs and in prosecuting this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^T)

day of May, 1997.

NEIL B. CRIST
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following individual at the address shown,
via first-class mail, postage prepaid on this J£(Q,
day of May,
1997:
Lowell V. Summerhays
Attorney at Law
32 West 6400 South, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

ZK^^st
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ADDENDUM

APPENDIX A:

Complaint from original case before Judge
Frederick

Lowell V. Summerhays-3154
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS
6400 Commerce Park
448 East 6400 South, Suite 314
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-4495
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NUF INC., A Utah
Corporation

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.

KENNETH MADSEN and
MARILYN MADSEN

Judge:

Defendants.
The Plaintiff by and though counsel Lowell V. Summerhays of
the

firm

of ADAMSON

& SUMMERHAYS

herewith

complains

of

the

Defendants and alleges as follows:
I.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - BREACH OF CONTRACT
FOR THE SALE OF TEN PERCENT INTEREST IN
SUMMERSET CRUISER HOUSEBOAT
AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS
1.

That Nuf, Inc.is a Utah Corporation with its principle

place of business Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

That Ken Madsen and Marilyn Madsen are residence of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

That the subject matter of this action is a contract

entered into and performable in Salt Lake County, State of Utah a
copy of which is annexed hereto, marked Exhibit A and incorporated

herein by reference.
4.

This court has jurisdiction over the general subject

matter of this action pursuant to 78-18-23.
5.

Pursuant to the terms of Exhibit A the Plaintiff, NUF

Corporation had the. right to have utilization

of a 62 foot

Summerset Cruiser houseboat for a total of six weeks
calendar year.

of each

The contract was subsequently amended for the

utilization of seven weeks per year and the provision of paragraph
one allowing the utilization of a Jet Ski Boat and a Wet Bike
concurrent with the utilization of the Summerset Cruiser

was

deleted.
6.

The Defendants have consistently since the inception of

this contract failed and refused to provide the utilization of the
Summerset Cruiser houseboat in accordance with the terms and
provision

of the contract

agreement and have

and

have completely

breached

said

at all times failed and refused the Plaintiff

the right to use the houseboat with the exception of a few days
utilization at undesirable times since the date of the contract.
7.

The Defendants have completely breach the contract have

failed and refused preform and do now fail and refuse to perform in
particular with the Defendants had promised utilization of the
c

houseboat for the week of July 5 through July 11, 1993 dominated as
the 27th week of the year.

Notice was given to the Plaintiff to

that effect on or about June 25, 1993 after the Plaintiff had made
full arrangements with its own personal and with friends of the
owners of Plaintiff for utilization of the houseboat from its
moorings at Height Marina on Lake Powell to be utilized on Lake

Powell at considerable

inconvenience

and lost time and at the

expense of their friendship and relationship involved therein.
8.

That the Plaintiff is entitled to

and order of this court

rescinding said contract and requiring the Defendants to return to
the Plaintiff the funds which they paid for the purchase of their
utilization rights in the houseboat in the amount of Ten Thousand
Dollars ($10,000.00) plus prejudgment and post judgement interest
at the highest legal rate.
9.

The agreement provides for payment of attorney fees in

paragraph 15 which provides in part as follows:
"In event of any default of under this Agreement, the
defaulting party agrees to pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs
of the prevailing party."
Pursuant to said paragraph the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgement
against the Defendant for reasonable attorney fees.
WHEREFORE
Defendants

the

Plaintiff

prays

for

judgement

against

the

jointly and separately as follows:

1.

For Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00),

2.

For Prejudgment and post judgment interest at the highest

legal rate,
3.

For reasonable attorney fees,

4.

For costs of court herein,

5.

For such other relief as the court deems just and proper.
II ..:•
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR SALE OF WAVE RUNNERS
AGAINST KENNETH D. MADSEN ONLY
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10.

The Plaintiff reallege all the allegations set forth in

paragraphs one through nine.
11. The Plaintiff entered into a contract with the Defendant,
Kenneth D. Madsen for the purchase of a fifty percent
ownership

in three wave runners

(50%)

serial numbers YAM20838J788,

YAM135141788 and YAM209045191. The basic terms and conditions are
set forth on page 4 of Exhibit A which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference.
12.

Pursuant to the terms of the written contract and verbal

representations and agreements made at the time it was entered
into, the Plaintiff was entitled to use the three wave runners for
fifty percent (50%) of the time and has not been able to do so.
13. The Plaintiff has suffered damages for loss of use of the
wave runners in the amount of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per
year and therefore has suffered damages in the amount of Four
Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) to date.
14.

The Defendant Kenneth Madsen represented and agreed that

he would sell a fifty percent (50%) interest in the three wave
runners at his cost. The actual sales price was Four thousand four
hundred fifty Dollars ($4,450.00) and based upon the information
and belief the Plaintiff alleges that the cost for fifty percent
(50%) of the wave runner was less than Four Thousand Four Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($4,450.00) and seeks from the court an accounting
from the Defendant of the actual cost and is entitled to a judgment
against the Defendant to the extent that the cost was less than the
actual sales price.
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15.

The Defendant, Kenneth Madsen fails and refuses to allow

the Plaintiff to use the wave runners fifty percent (50%) of the
time and continues to so and threatens to continue to do so in the
further.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a judgement against the

Defendant, Kenneth D. Madsen ordering him to allow the Plaintiff to
exercise his fifty percent (50%) utilization and ownership rights
in the three wave runners.
16.

The Defendant asserted to the Plaintiff that there is a

contractual and or legal obligation pursuant to course of dealing
contract and legal liability of the parties pursuant to which the
Plaintiff has an obligation to either sell or buy a one half (1/2)
interest in the three wave runners for Three Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars ($3,500.00).

The Plaintiff is entitle to a declaratory

judgement from this court determining that no such contractual or
legal obligation exist.
17.

The agreement is part of page 4 of the contract annexed

hereto as Exhibit A and the Plaintiff is entitled to the benefits
of paragraph fifteen of said exhibit A in as much as the contract
are integrated contracts and the Plaintiff is therefore entitled to
reasonable attorney fees under the terms and provisions of this
second cause of action.
WHEREFORE

the Plaintiff prays for judgement against the

Defendant as follows:
1.
2.

For Four Thousand Dollars damages,
For a declaratory judgment and restraining order and

injunction heretofore set forth.
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3.

For reasonable attorney fees,

4.

For cost of court herein,

5.

For such other relief as the court deems just and proper.
III.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
COMPLAINT FOR ACCOUNTING ON MAINTENANCE FEES
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT KENNETH MADSEN

18.

The Plaintiff reasserts and alleges the allegation of

paragraphs one through nine of the second cause of action and ten
through

seventeen

of

the

second

cause

of

action

as

through

specifically set forth herein.
19.
verbal

Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Exhibit A, and
agreements

entered

into

in

connection

therewith

the

Plaintiff has been required and induced to pay annual maintenance
fees for the Summerset Cruiser houseboat and upon information and
belief alleges that certain fees were requested in connection with
maintenance of the three wave runners.
20.

The Plaintiff has made the following yearly payments on

maintenance:
A.

1990 - Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00)

B.

1991 _ Twelve Hundred Dollars ($1200.00)

C.

1992 - Twelve Hundred Dollars (1200.00)

21.

Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Plaintiff's

agreement with respect to maintenance he is obligated to be twenty
percent (20%) of the total maintenance under paragraph 4 of Exhibit
A which would mean that the remaining eighty percent (80%) of the
6

maintenance would have to be paid by the Defendants and or their
assigned or designees.
22.

The Plaintiff

is entitled to an accounting of the

maintenance expenses, income,

and utilization of the proceeds

thereof and the court should enter a declaratory judgement and
order requiring the Defendants to provide said accounting.
23.

If the accounting discloses that the Plaintiff has paid

a disproportion of the maintenance the Plaintiff is entitled to a
judgement against the Defendants for the difference.
24.

The Plaintiff are entitled reasonable attorney fees

pursuant to paragraph 15 of Exhibit A.
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff prays for a judgement against the
Defendants jointly and separately as follows:
1. For an accounting,
2.

For a judgement for any over payment of maintenance,

3. For prejudgment and post judgement interest at the highest
legal rate.
4.

For reasonable attorney fees,

5.

For cost of court herein,

6.

For such other relief as the court may deem just and

proper.
IV.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST BOTH DEFENDANTS
25.

The Plaintiff reallege the allegations of paragraph one

through nine of the first cause of action and paragraph ten though
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seventeen for the second cause of action and paragraphs eighteen
though twenty four of the third cause of action.
26.

The Plaintiff has been deprived of his fair right of

utilization of the Summerset Cruiser houseboat for at least three
weeks per year for the three years during which they have held an
ownership interest the craft.
27.

The reasonable weekly value of one weeks use is Eighteen

hundred dollars

($1800.00) for a total of nine lost weeks of

utilization for a total of damages for loss of use in the amount of
Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($16,200.00)
28.

The Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees

pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Exhibit A.
WHEREFORE

the Plaintiff

prays

for judgement

against the

Defendant as follows:
1.

For Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars,

2.

For reasonable attorney fees,

3. For prejudgment and post judgement interest at the highest
legal rate.
4.

For costs of court herein,

5.

For such other relief as the court deems just and proper.
V.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FRAUD AGAINST KEN MADSEN ONLY

29.

The Plaintiff reallege the allegations of paragraph one

through nine of the first cause of action, paragraphs ten through
seventeen of the second cause of action, paragraphs eighteen
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through twenty four of the third cause of action and paragraphs
twenty five through twenty eight of the fourth cause of action,
30.

The

Defendant

Ken

Madsen

made

a

material

misrepresentation in order to induce the Plaintiff to enter into
the contract which is Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated
herein by reference.
31.

The material misrepresentation is that the boat at the

time of the sale was available for unlimited utilization and would
certainly be available for a minimum of six weeks each summer. The
representation made that the existing condition of ownership,
storage, utilization and condition of the craft would allow such
utilization and there would be no changes and no changes were
intended

that

would

preclude

such

utilization.

A

second

misrepresentation was that at the time of the execution of the
contract the boat would be transferred to the name of a partnership
to include the Plaintiff as listed owner as a member of the
partnership.
32. The boat was not available for utilization. There was no
present intent on the part of the Defendant to create a partnership
and list the title in the Plaintiff's name.
33.

The boat has not been available since the date of the

contract for six weeks and or unlimited utilization and the
transfer of the title has never occurred and there was never
utilization availability and there was never an intent to convey
the title but rather an intent not to convey the title.
34.

The misrepresentations were made regarding material
9

existing current facts.
35.

The Plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentations.

36.

The Plaintiff's reliance was reasonable.

37.

But for the misrepresentations the Plaintiff would not

have entered into the contract.
38.

As a result of the misrepresentations the Plaintiff has

been damaged in the amount of Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars
($16,200.00) as set forth in the preceding cause of action.
39.

The

action

of

the

Defendant, Kenneth

Madsen

were

malicious, wrongful, intentional and the Plaintiff is entitled to
punitive

damages

in

the

amount

of

Eight

Thousand

Dollars

($8,000.00) .
40. The Plaintiff is entitle to attorney fees as is specified
in the contract.
WHEREFORE

the

Plaintiff

prays

for

judgment

against

the

Defendant, Kenneth Madsen as follows:
1.

For Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($16,200.00) as

actual damages.
2.

For Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00) punitive damages.

3.

For reasonable attorney fees,

4. For prejudgment and post judgement interest at the highest
legal rate.
5.
6.

For cost of court herein.
For such other relief as the court may deem just and

proper.
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DATED this

frw

day of

^'y

1993.

ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS

Lowell V. Summerha^s
Attorney for Plaintiff
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